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y assignment at the symposium at which this Article was 
presented was to relate private standard setting to the 
symposium theme: the “public and the private,” and the possibility 
that whatever “boundaries” they may have are in “transition.”  I am 
very glad to have done it.  The antitrust relevance of standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs) is obvious enough.  In the ordinary case, at least 
a few of an SSO’s participants will have some pecuniary stake in the 
organization’s work, and they might be able to use its influence for 
anticompetitive ends.  SSOs have made appearances off and on in 
antitrust matters for many years, and the antitrust community has 
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always had them in more or less conscious awareness as matters of 
concern.  But I believe that in some respects a larger aspect of their 
significance has been overlooked.1  I believe they uniquely implicate 
certain deep and not very visible theoretical issues in our competition 
policy.  Those deeper issues have led us to develop a complicated, 
shared system of responsibility for resource allocation. 
Among lawyers, standard setting occasioned a brief flurry of 
academic interest about ten to fifteen years ago,2 apparently because it 
sat nicely at the juncture of three trends of then growing interest: the 
procompetitive potential of some horizontal collaborations, the 
relationship between antitrust and the evolving high-tech sector, and 
the emerging economics of “network” effects.3  A bit more recently, 
SSOs have been a fairly hot topic again, owing to a spate of high-
profile Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenges to alleged 
 
1 I have also written about these matters in a few prior articles.  See Christopher L. 
Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the 
Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393 (2004) [hereinafter Case Study]; 
Chris Sagers, Commentary, Raising the Price of Pork in Texas: A Few Thoughts on 
Ghosh, Bush, and the Future of the Antitrust Immunities, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 395 (2008) 
[hereinafter Pork in Texas].  I address the larger issues in Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal 
Structure of American Freedom and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 
UTAH L. REV. 927 (2002), Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism, and Public-Private in the 
Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219 (2006) [hereinafter Monism], and 
Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007) [hereinafter 
Myth]. 
2 See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and 
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1995); David A. Balto, Standard 
Setting in the 21st Century Network Economy, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., June 2001, 
at 5; Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set Standards or Define Interfaces, 61 
ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1993); Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: 
Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 
EMORY L.J. 583 (1998); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and 
Professional Association Standards and Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471 (1994); 
Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues 
Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331 (2003); Douglas D. Leeds, 
Essay, Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting Consortia in High 
Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INT. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 641 (1997); Mark A. 
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 
(1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Rights]; 
Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. 
REV. 822 (2001). Standard setting was also the focus of several symposia.  See, e.g., 
Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1695 (2003); Symposium, Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State, L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 1. 
3 This is nicely explained in Gates, supra note 2, at 585–97. 
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“patent hold-ups.”4  Of course SSOs were also involved in a 
smattering of very well-known matters going back several decades,5 
 
4 While the specifics of the patent hold-up cases turn out not to be especially relevant to 
the concerns of this Article, several of them––especially the FTC’s recent and much-
discussed Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S.Ct. 1318 (2009), and Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (N-Data), No. C-4234 
(F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008)––are big and important cases in their own right and deserve at 
least some discussion here. 
 A patent hold-up occurs when an SSO participant fails to disclose that it owns patents 
that would be infringed by the adoption of a standard under consideration before the SSO.  
If patent rights are incorporated into a standard, and the standard then becomes significant 
in the industry, that participant may acquire a significant degree of market power it 
otherwise would not have.  The first of the FTC’s patent hold-up cases resulted in a fairly 
broad consent order constraining the computer manufacturer, Dell, Inc., from enforcing 
patents that it managed to include in an influential standard, allegedly by lying about them.  
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).  Another very interesting matter was the 
long-running Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), 140 F.T.C. 123 (2005), which raised the 
arguably distinct circumstance of a patentee misleading a quasi-public regulatory body to 
include patented technology in a state-mandated standard.  Importantly, had the Unocal 
litigation proceeded any further, it surely would have raised legal issues central to points 
made in this Article, but those issues were mooted when Unocal was acquired by Chevron, 
and a consent order followed. 
 A case that is now probably much more significant, based on facts like those in Dell, is 
the FTC’s ultimately unsuccessful monopolization action against the computer memory 
maker, Rambus.  The case is much bigger because of the FTC’s loss before the D.C. 
Circuit and the reasoning on which that court rejected liability.  See Rambus, 522 F.3d 
456.  The FTC has also received a lot of attention for its decision in N-Data, in which the 
majority upheld liability solely on the basis of the FTC’s unfair competition authority, 
with no separate finding of a Sherman Act violation.  N-Data, No. C-4234 (F.T.C. Sept. 
22, 2008).  Among other things, the final consent order was approved over then 
Commissioner Kovacic’s dissent, and when the complaint was first issued, then Chairman 
Majoras and Commissioner Kovacic both issued lengthy, analytical dissents challenging 
the free-standing Section 5 liability theory. 
 The FTC first began initiating these matters at a time when the agency took high-tech 
standard setting as a special policy focus.  See, e.g., David A. Balto, Assistant Dir. Office 
of Policy & Evaluation, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standard Setting in a Network Economy, 
Speech Before Cutting Edge Antitrust Law Seminar (Feb. 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.htm; Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Implications in Standard Setting, Remarks at the District of 
Columbia Bar Annual Seminar on Antitrust and Trade Associations (Feb. 22, 1995), 
available at 1995 WL 232950.  However, the special interest the Commission took at that 
time may also have reflected a longer-standing interest in standard setting generally.  See 
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, STANDARDS AND 
CERTIFICATION: FINAL STAFF REPORT (1983) (reporting staff’s findings, made during a 
long investigation in support of a contemplated rule making, after an uncommonly surgical 
statutory change to the Commission’s organic statute removed its rule-making power as to 
standards). 
5 Two well-known cases are Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492 (1988), and Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 
(1982).  In both, the Court upheld antitrust liability where manufacturers that were SSO 
members used SSO procedures to injure competitors.  Going back a bit further, in Radiant 
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but to most antitrust observers, the topic now feels familiar and 
probably a little passé.  It seems mainly like an intellectual property 
issue of especial interest to counselors of high-tech clients. 
I believe that impression is incorrect.  When the standard-setting 
phenomenon is considered in a bigger picture, it tends to cast doubt 
on one particular idea, which I believe is central to our politics but is 
not thought about much.  The idea is that the basic choice in public 
policy is between regulation by public bureaucracies on the one hand 
and by markets on the other.  In prior work, I have suggested 
theoretical reasons to doubt that that is the case.6  This symposium is 
a nice opportunity to marshal some qualitative empirical evidence 
against it as well. 
This Article is basically a sociological exercise.  It will make two 
basic arguments about how the role of standard setting in our 
economy is at odds with the commonly assumed dichotomy between 
bureaucracy and markets.  First, I stress the great ubiquity and 
influence of standard-setting activity in the United States.  A large 
proportion of the standards we adopt have more or less binding force, 
and they exert influence far beyond high technology and 
manufacturing.  They are everywhere.  Moreover, most matters 
governed by standards are not subject to any government oversight.  
They are formulated outside the government purview, and they get 
their influence not from the formal force of law but from independent 
forces.  And yet, as I argue, those standards cannot easily be 
explained as merely the results of market-driven influences.  That is 
to say, even though most standards are formulated outside any 
government purview––and, therefore, under the bureaucracy-markets 
dichotomy, should be explainable in some way as the product of 
competitive markets––they are in fact not subject to price-competitive 
pressures.  In the discussion below, I relate this phenomenon to 
theoretical developments in the social sciences concerning 
“isomorphism” or “institutionalism” in markets.7  Second, the nature 
of standards activities also tends to suggest that much of the social 
decision making that occurs outside of markets is not actually 
 
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), the Court permitted an 
antitrust action to proceed against an SSO itself where there were allegations that its 
repeated refusals to approve a new technology were fueled by anticompetitive motivations.  
Several important but less well-known cases are discussed infra notes 40–48 and 
accompanying text. 
6 See Myth, supra note 1. 
7 See infra Part II. 
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overseen by government––contrary to the impression given by the 
bureaucracy-markets dichotomy.  This second issue is the flip side of 
the first.  The ubiquity of SSOs not only casts some doubt on the 
prominence of markets as resource allocators but also casts some 
doubt on government as markets’ chief alternative. 
This evidence also sheds some light on the question specifically 
posed as the theme of this symposium.  I believe that the 
“boundaries” between “public” and “private,” such as they are, are 
not actually changing that much.  At least so far as private regulatory 
conduct goes, things have been more or less the same for a long time.  
Instead, I believe the problem is simply the imagery by which we 
imagine those boundaries.  I believe that imagery has long been 
inaccurate. 
I 
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 
It is central to this Article to capture the standards sector in a 
bigger picture.  I believe that, when seen in the bigger picture, it is 
clearer how private regulatory conduct usurps some of the control we 
ordinarily assume is held by either markets or state entities.  
Fortunately, though, extensive digression will not be needed here.  
The history and work of the SSOs is exhaustively recounted in dozens 
of significant federal policy reports;8 an extensive historical literature, 
which now includes a number of book-length histories;9 and a rich 
 
8 See 1 STAFF, FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: 
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 1 FTC REP. 
234–63 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf; BUREAU OF 
COMPETITION, supra note 4; OFFICE. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., GLOBAL 
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE (1992), available at http://www 
.strategicstandards.com/files/GlobalStandards.pdf; MAUREEN A. BREITENBERG, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE ABC’S OF STANDARDS-
RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1987).  Also, the federal agency most 
engaged in the standards sector, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is 
now required by statute to deliver an annual report to Congress concerning the standards 
sector and the government’s role in it.  See National Technology Transfer and 
Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (implemented by Office of 
Management and Budget, Circular No. A-119, at § 9(c) (1998), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119/#13). 
9 See, e.g., SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND 
STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (1997); DOUGLAS J. PUFFERT, TRACKS ACROSS 
CONTINENTS, PATHS THROUGH HISTORY: THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF 
STANDARDIZATION IN RAILWAY GAUGE (2009); ANDREW LAWRENCE RUSSELL, 
“INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATURES”: CONSENSUS STANDARDIZATION IN THE SECOND AND 
THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS (Aug. 2007) (Ph.D dissertation, Johns Hopkins Univ.), 
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body of theory detailing what are thought to be the economic costs 
and benefits.10 
In the remainder of this Part, I highlight only three especially 
useful points: what standards are, as a matter of definition; the nature 
of the world in which standards are made, including the important 
matter of the relationships that most influential SSOs enjoy with 
federal, state, and local governments; and a summary of the legal 
treatment of SSO conduct in antitrust law. 
A.  What Are Standards? 
Discussion of standards activities is sometimes a bit clouded by 
confusion of two distinct questions: (1) what a standard is and (2) 
how a standard is made.  In much of the policy debate, especially 
among lawyers, the first question is answered not directly, but by 
reference to the second question—by a description of the institutions 
or processes that produce standards.  Definitions often describe a 
standard as the product of one of the traditional, formal SSOs––like 
 
available at https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/32576/alr-diss      
-08012007-CBO-opt.pdf; HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 
(2005); Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson, The Contemporary Expansion of 
Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS 1 (Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson eds., 
2000); Paul A. David & Mark Shurmer, Formal Standards-Setting for Global 
Telecommunications and Information Services, 20 TELECOMM. POL’Y 789, 790–93 
(1996); Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development 
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1978); 
Marc A. Olshan, Standards-Making Organizations and the Rationalization of American 
Life, 34 SOC. Q. 319 (1993); Marian P. Opala, The Anatomy of Private Standards-Making 
Process: The Operating Procedures of the USA Standards Institute, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 45 
(1969). 
10 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Some New Standards for the Economics of Standardization 
in the Information Age, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 206 
(Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman eds., 1987); Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The 
Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to the Recent Scholarship, 1 
ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3 (1990); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 
Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in System Markets, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 413 
(2000); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 
19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, 
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Thomas M. Jorde & David 
J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 75; Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, 
Collective and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377 (1983); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 
(1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Martin B. H. Weiss, The Standards 
Development Process: A View from Political Theory, STANDARDVIEW, Dec. 1993, at 35. 
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the familiar American National Standards Institute (ANSI) or 
American Society of Testing and Materials––or of one of the more ad 
hoc industry consortia that have become common in high-tech sectors 
in the past few decades––like VESA, the group at issue in the FTC’s 
recent Dell action.11  But defining “standard” only as the product of 
the familiar, formal standard-setters that produce some of them is 
significantly underinclusive. 
Finding a better answer for the first question is very difficult 
because “standard” turns out to be hard to define in any way except 
with so much generality that it loses its meaning.12  Thinkers tend to 
wax fairly philosophical about this idea’s great generality; one 
commentator, paraphrasing Walt Whitman no less, defined it as “vast 
similitude of symbols, numbers, alphabets, currency, weights, 
measurement systems, navigational elements and communications 
systems.”13  Some other, more homely definitions are no less 
expansive, so much that one wonders what there could be that would 
not be a standard.  For example, “A standard is a formulation [for] 
specifying certain features of a unit or basis of measurement, a 
physical object, an action, a process, a method, a practice, a capacity, 
a function, . . . a duty, a right, a responsibility, a behavior, an attitude, 
a concept, or a conception.”14  It is also clear that, by any realistic 
definition, “standards” are very old and are fundamental to much of 
 
11 Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).  The Dell matter is discussed supra 
note 4. 
12 Many definitions have been offered.  See, e.g., C. BONGERS, STANDARDIZATION: 
MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ASSORTMENT DETERMINATION 2 (1980) (adopting a 
product-specific notion of “standard” but noting that “the word product must be 
interpreted in its broadest sense” and that “a product is any good or service . . . includ[ing] 
services like education and jurisdiction”); DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE 
VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 4 (1975) (A standard is “something taken for a basis 
of comparison, or that which is accepted for current use through authority, custom or 
general consent.”); 1 INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, STANDARDIZATION 
VOCABULARY: BASIC TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (1971) (“Standardization is the process 
of formulating and applying rules for an orderly approach to a specific activity for the 
benefit and with the cooperation of all concerned, and in particular for the promotion of 
optimum overall economy, taking due account of functional conditions and safety 
requirements.”); cf. Gerla, supra note 2, at 472 (noting that “[n]o exact definition exists for 
the term ‘standard’”). 
13 Ken Krechmer, Standards Mark the Course of Economic Progress (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.csrstds.com/fundeco.html. 
14 JOHN GAILLARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND 
APPLICATION 33 (1934). 
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the working of societies.15  Money, for example, and its inextricably 
entwined partner concepts of weight and measurement, are primordial 
standardizations that arose very early in most economies and 
developed in very similar ways in cultures that had little interaction 
with one another.16  A need for standardization is fundamental 
enough that the U.S. Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to 
regulate weights and measures,17 and standardization was the subject 
of concerted action in the United States very early in the country’s 
history.  Routinization or regularization seems to ease interaction 
among individuals, groups, and peoples, and acts as an interface 
between individuals and the physical world they inhabit.  It is perhaps 
a solution to problems posed by human epistemic incapacity, bounded 
rationality, and constraints on resources.18  To borrow a phrase, it 
seems that this human penchant for regularization is an effort to use 
the world’s own redundancies to utilize the world more simply,19 and 
it seems to run very deeply in our nature. 
In any case, the definitional problem nicely illustrates the two 
public-private aspects of standardization that I discuss below.  First, 
 
15 Evidence of conscious standardization exists from as early as 7000 BCE, when 
uniform cubic or cylindrical stones were used in Egypt as measures of weight.  Both 
standard weights and other measurement exemplars were later used in Babylon and India.  
Hundreds of other examples can be found from various bygone times.  In 1120, Henry I of 
England mandated a uniform measure of length based on the length of his own arm; 
medieval European market rules widely regulated products, weights, and measures; and 
the leaders of Massachusetts Bay Colony standardized a number of products long before 
the Revolution, including beer, bread, nails, and bricks.  The most significant gestures to 
give rise to what might be thought the “modern” era of standardization occurred primarily 
in the late eighteenth century.  They included the adoption of the metric system by the 
newly empowered French Academy of Sciences and the design of interchangeable musket 
components by Eli Whitney in 1780.  Whitney’s innovation is commonly said to have 
introduced mass production to the United States.  See generally Edward Eugene Gallahue, 
Some Factors in the Development of Market Standards 20–31 (1942) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
published at 9 CATH. U. AM. STUD. ECON. (1943)); KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 26–28 
(discussing historical trends of standardization); LAL C. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION: A 
NEW DISCIPLINE 2–8 (1973); BREITENBERG, supra note 8, at 3–4; Olshan, supra note 9, at 
320–21 (summarizing the history of standards-making organizations). 
16 See Kindleberger, supra note 10, at 383–84 (exploring the standardization of money 
as a medium of exchange); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF 
MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774–1970 (1973); KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 9–11. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (empowering Congress “[t]o coin Money, regulate the 
Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures”). 
18 Other reasons can drive routinization.  It sometimes serves as a tool for serving 
personal ends, for example, as when a sovereign mints currency as a route to prestige, 
power, and wealth.  See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 9. 
19 See generally Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. 
PHIL. SOC’Y 467 (1962). 
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standard setting is ubiquitous.  Activity not clearly distinguishable 
from traditional “standard setting” occurs not just in technology or 
manufacturing sectors, but everywhere.20  Standard setting often 
appears in code-like form, which resembles the work of legislatures.21  
But it can also appear as a statement of authoritative opinion;22 as a 
“rule,” like a professional ethical rule or union “work rule”;23 and as 
private adjudication.24 
Second, when conceived so broadly, “standard setting” plainly 
includes some conduct that seems less like private collaboration and 
more like some sort of participation in policy or government.  On the 
one hand, it turns out to be pretty difficult to define “standard” in a 
way that robustly distinguishes it from “law.”  One might think the 
difference is that standards are made by “private” entities, but that 
distinction just restates the question and makes it no less difficult––it 
just begs the basically hopeless question of whether there is some line 
between “public” and “private.”25  On the other hand, standard-setting 
 
20 I have offered the following in a previous article and think it is appropriate here as 
well: 
“Standard,” for present purposes, means a normative rule or opinion issued by a 
group qua group and intended to change or regulate some area of human 
endeavor.  This is plainly not the only possible definition, and theoretical 
consideration of the idea seems potentially very interesting and important.  But 
for present purposes it is really only important to cast the definitional net widely, 
because the range of conduct that raises the concerns discussed here is very 
broad. 
Case Study, supra note 1, at 1402–03 (footnote omitted). 
21 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) 
(considering one such legislation-like code). 
22 Cf. Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399–400 (7th Cir. 
1989); see also infra note 63 (discussing the unique problems presented by Schachar). 
23 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (considering 
ethical rules of a voluntary professional association that limited some forms of 
advertising); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (holding 
illegal a “work rule” issued by a self-styled “union” of dentists that no member shall 
release certain patient information to dental insurers); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773 (1975) (holding illegal a minimum fee schedule imposed by local bar associations). 
24 ABA accreditation, for example, superficially resembles an adjudicatory function but 
is in fact an application of the ABA’s own standards for law school quality and, therefore, 
seems substantively indistinguishable from other standard-setting conduct.  Similarly, 
SSOs that issue product safety and quality standards frequently maintain product 
certification programs to verify that particular products comply with the relevant standard.  
For example, ANSI oversees a number of accreditation and certification bodies that issue 
opinions as to whether a particular product or process complies with the appropriate ANSI 
standard. 
25 Monism, supra note 1, at 240–47; Myth, supra note 1, at 57–63. 
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conduct can be made to look a lot like mere lobbying or petitioning of 
government, as SSOs frequently adopt their standards explicitly in the 
hope that they will be incorporated by governments into official law.  
As will be seen, the courts have struggled with problems like these 
quite a bit.26 
One other topic is relevant.  A question closely related to what 
standards are is from where they derive their power.  Some standards 
are literally law; thousands of them have been incorporated into 
federal, state, and local law.  But those that are not can still be 
extremely influential.  Commonly, standards are incorporated by 
reference in private procurement and other contracting.  They can also 
be of huge influence merely as a matter of product differentiation.  
Affixing the seal of a given SSO may come to connote quality or 
safety, and when that ability to indicate quality comes about, the SSO 
tends to accrue influence over manufacturers of an essentially 
regulatory kind.  Finally, in the presence of network effects, the 
adoption of a standard by some number of users will have the effect 
of “tipping” or “locking in” the standard. 
B.  How Are Standards Made? 
The history and present circumstances of the U.S. standards sector 
are fascinating and bound up with basic themes in American history.  
But for present purposes, only a few things are really important to 
know.  First, at the risk of redundancy, the standards sector is large.  
Though an exact measurement would be very labor intensive to come 
by, a reasonable prediction is that the amount of “private” law in the 
United States, made in more or less legislative fashion by private 
bureaucracies, now exceeds the amount that is “public.”  Moreover, 
the consequences of this fact are aggravated by diminished public 
resources and the government “downsizing” mania of the past few 
decades.  The relative importance of the standards sector as a 
regulator of our economy is exaggerated by the fact that government 
downsizing has devastated the government’s own ability to administer 
those laws that it does oversee.27 
 
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for 
Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 330–37 (2004); Steven L. Schooner, 
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 278–84 
(2004). 
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Second, the standards sector as we now know it has evolved over a 
long period of time, and a central theme of that evolution is the close 
relations between SSOs and government at all levels.  As for state and 
local governments, parties on all sides have carefully nurtured 
relations for mutual benefit.28  The benefit to SSOs includes, perhaps 
in addition to other things, influence––thousands of private standards 
are now routinely adopted directly into state and local law.  The 
advantage to state and local governments includes at least the saving 
in legislative resources.  It may also include the opportunity to favor 
influential lobbies, as for example when state bar authorities adopt 
ethical rules and law school accreditation decisions of the American 
Bar Association.  An important aspect of relationships like these––
which is relevant in Part III below––is that, when state and local 
governments adopt standards, they often do so through either 
incorporation by reference or verbatim adoption.  While this is 
obviously not true of all standards––such as the adoption of lawyer 
ethics rules, for example––the evidence is that, when private 
standards are adopted, they are given very little substantive 
consideration by formal government representatives.  When that 
happens, substantive policy is formulated within the SSOs and not by 
government. 
The federal government’s relationship with SSOs has been more 
complex.  Like state and local governments, the federal government is 
a large consumer of private standards, but the federal government has 
also participated in the very creation of the standards sector.  Still, the 
federal government’s role mainly has been reactive, supportive, and, 
ultimately, passive.  Its role has been to nurture or comply in the 
creation of a regulatory system that, for reasons of politics––not, 
fundamentally, reasons of practical or logical necessity––has 
remained “private” and that effectively handles a very large portion of 
this country’s regulatory work.  Over the long history of the growth of 
this apparatus, the federal government’s relationship to SSOs has 
been highly deferential, and, above all, the relationship has been ad 
hoc.  That is hardly to say, however, that this relationship has been 
unimportant. 
The bulk of U.S. policy toward private regulation resides in the 
symbiosis between two entities, one public and one nominally private.  
They are the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
a federal agency within the Department of Commerce, and ANSI, a 
 
28 See Case Study, supra note 1. 
SAGERS 4/5/2011  3:22 PM 
796 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 785 
privately organized body that, as the political scientist Samuel Krislov 
put it, acts as a “holding company” to oversee other private entities.29  
NIST and ANSI have partnered in varying ways to oversee U.S 
standards activity for roughly one hundred years.  A chief theme of 
this relationship has been NIST’s almost unwavering deference to the 
private sector and ANSI’s generally leading role.  Thus, while ANSI 
often claims not to produce any standards of its own,30 it sits atop a 
more or less formal hierarchy that produces the vast bulk of 
America’s private regulation.  ANSI does so chiefly through its 
stewardship over the American National Standards (ANS), a large 
collection of standards made by ANSI’s SSO members according to 
ANSI’s prescribed procedural framework.31  While it is not entirely 
accurate to imagine U.S. standard setting as a neat pyramid with 
ANSI at the top,32 the bulk of the work is undertaken within the ANSI 
family of organizations and is subject to ANSI procedural oversight. 
 
29 See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 101.  Organized as a non-profit corporation composed 
of about one hundred thousand company, organization, and government members, ANSI 
was created in 1918 as an umbrella organization to coordinate the efforts of the several 
independent SSOs that had sprung up during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  About ANSI Overview, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview 
/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
30 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 
1086 Before the Task Force on Antitrust of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 11 
(2003) (statement of David L. Karmol, Vice President of Public Policy and Government 
Affairs, American National Standards Institute) (“ANSI does not write standards; it serves 
as a catalyst for standards development by its diverse membership.”). 
 The claim seems false in two senses.  First, through its effective control of the loose 
system of U.S. standard setting, ANSI has standardized the process by which the vast bulk 
of standards are adopted (mainly by setting standards for what ANSI describes as “due 
process”).  Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1343–47.  Second, about twenty-five percent of the 
standards included in ANSI’s American National Standards are developed by the 
American National Standards Committees.  Id. at 1343.  These committees are created 
under ANSI auspices and are normally managed by one of ANSI’s own organizational 
members, which ANSI appoints as the committee’s “secretariat.”  Id.  Thus, though 
functionally separate, it is somewhat hard to see any distinction in substance between 
ANSI itself and the development of these standards. 
31 The actual process by which ANSI’s subsidiary SSOs do their work and seek 
approval of their standards as American National Standards is quite complex.  A very nice 
summary can be found in Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1341–68. 
32 ANSI’s own members are not required to submit their standards for inclusion in the 
American National Standards, and with some frequency they do not.  Likewise, there are 
any number of U.S. SSOs that are not ANSI members at all and do not submit their 
standards to it.  Some such outside organizations are quite influential and often they 
promulgate standards that overlap and conflict with American National Standards.  See 
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1342–43.  Likewise, industry consortia, now a significant 
feature of private regulation, are outside the ANSI framework. 
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Beyond the NIST-ANSI partnership, the world of private 
regulation in the United States is fairly divorced from traditional 
government.  This world remains dominated by a handful of very 
large SSOs, most of which are within the family overseen by ANSI.33  
Most of these entities arose during the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth centuries, at a time when ANSI itself had not yet been 
formed to coordinate their activities, and they seem mainly to have 
reflected the then booming American Industrial Revolution.  They 
served societal concerns about growing risks to labor and consumers 
and the growing need to coordinate manufacturing for interoperability 
among products.34  Other major organizations arose during the same 
period and have played lasting roles but have served interests other 
than the needs of industry or professional groups.  For example, the 
well-known Underwriters Laboratories, initially created by a group of 
insurers to reduce liability for fire damage, evolved into a fully 
independent testing laboratory primarily concerned with promoting 
the safety of consumer products.  Likewise, Consumers Union, 
publisher of the familiar Consumer Reports magazine, began as an 
offshoot of a NIST predecessor and was led by officials of the 
predecessor agency who were frustrated by its refusal to champion 
consumer protection objectives.35 
The federal government’s fondness for the private standards sector, 
and its eagerness neither to regulate nor usurp it, has now grown so 
great that it has made itself their largest consumer.  Through statute 
and elaborate implementation rules, the government has required 
itself to use privately adopted standards in both federal procurement 
 
33 By far the most significant of these is the American Society of Testing and Materials, 
which is both the largest producer of standards in the United States and the source of about 
half of ANSI’s American National Standards.  See id. at 1342.  Other such entities are the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, and the American Gas Association. 
34 Id. at 1368.  Often cited examples of the need for standardization perceived at the 
turn of the century include a major fire in the City of Baltimore, at which firefighters from 
other cities had to stand by helplessly because their hose couplings would not fit the city’s 
water supply; a boiler explosion at a shoe factory in Brockton, Massachusetts, that killed 
fifty-eight people and wounded 117 others; and the need for efficiency and conservation in 
the government’s manufacturing effort during World War I.  See KRISLOV, supra note 9, 
at 27, 90–91; Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1368. 
35 See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 94–95.  Strictly speaking, Consumers Union does not 
promulgate “standards” or any sort of regulatory guidance but rather tests products and 
reports on their safety and quality.  However, the organization grew out of the standards 
movement of the turn of the twentieth century and serves its basic agenda. 
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and regulation wherever they exist and meet certain minimum 
criteria.36 
C.  Antitrust Treatment 
Again, courts have not been insensitive to the antitrust risks that 
SSOs might pose, and notwithstanding the fact that SSOs recently 
earned a large measure of statutory protection,37 most of their conduct 
is nominally subject to some antitrust scrutiny.  In an earlier day, the 
courts took quite a firm stance, most prominently in the famous 
Radiant Burners opinion of 1961––a very terse per curiam reversal of 
a dismissal in which the Court, relying almost exclusively on its then 
recent Klors decision, seemed to hold any arbitrary refusal to certify a 
given product to be per se illegal.38  However, despite some more 
recent indications that the Court still meant business,39 the more 
 
36 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, 
110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)) (mandating the use by federal 
agencies of any “voluntary consensus” standard that exists in their procurement and 
regulation).  The “voluntary consensus” provision is implemented by the Office of 
Management and Budget, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary 
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, Circular No. A-119, Rev., 
63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998). 
37 Standards Development Organization Advancement (SDO) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4305 (2006)).  
The SDO Act modified the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 to 
provide that traditional voluntary consensus SSOs could enjoy the same protections as 
joint ventures enjoy under that Act.  15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2006).  That is to say that (1) so 
long as the SSO engages only in “developing, promulgating, revising, amending, 
reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or using 
such standard in conformity assessment,” id. § 4301(a)(7), it can be challenged only under 
the rule of reason, id. § 4302; (2) the SSO may enjoy an award of attorney’s fees if it 
“substantially prevail[s]” in an antitrust suit on that conduct, id. § 4304; and (3) if the SSO 
makes a proper filing with the enforcement agencies, it can be liable only in actual 
damages for that conduct, id. § 4303. 
38 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1961) 
(citing Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)). 
39 First, during the eighties the U.S. Supreme Court decided two important cases 
upholding antitrust liability for SSOs or their members.  See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. 
v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (upholding liability for an SSO member that 
abused the SSO’s procedures to procure a standard unfavorable to a competitor’s product); 
Am. Soc’y Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (upholding 
liability for an SSO where one of its agents, who was the plaintiff’s competitor, 
manipulated the organization’s procedures to deny the plaintiff’s product a certification). 
 Second, as Gates’s article nicely explains, the Northwest Wholesale Stationers Court 
gave one laconic, apparently approving indication that some SSO behavior could still be 
per se illegal.  See Gates, supra note 2, at 625–27.  The Court’s famous discussion of 
forms of boycott that are still per se––those that “involve[] joint efforts by a firm or firms 
to disadvantage competitors by . . . directly [depriving them of] relationships the[y] . . . 
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recent trend has been much more deferential.40  In the course of 
making these rulings, the courts frequently make a point of stressing 
the social benefits that standardization may bring.41 
But beyond that, all that can really be said is that the courts’ 
current approach to SSO cases is a makeshift one that leaves much 
uncertainty.  The courts have said little more than that, absent nakedly 
anticompetitive side agreements among members or some other 
blatant abuse, standard-setting conduct is subject to some 
unelaborated degree of rule of reason scrutiny.42  Among the major 
issues is whether the procedural propriety of an SSO’s decision 
making can matter.  “No” might seem a reasonable guess, given the 
uncompromising explanation Justice Brennan gave in the analytically 
similar Northwest Wholesale Stationers case: 
[T]he absence of procedural safeguards [within a private 
organization] can in no sense determine . . . antitrust analysis.  If the 
challenged concerted activity of [the organization’s] members 
would amount to a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, no 
amount of procedural protection would save it.  If the challenged 
action would not amount to a violation of § 1, no lack of procedural 
protections would convert it into a per se violation because the 
 
need in the competitive struggle”––included a citation to Radiant Burners.  Nw. 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The citation included in a parenthetical that the case 
involved “denial of necessary certification of [a] product.”  Id.; see Gates, supra note 2, at 
625–27 (discussing Radiant Burners).  Later courts have distinguished this citation by 
pointing out that, in Radiant Burners, the only supplier of natural gas in Chicago agreed 
with a manufacturer’s association to supply gas only to homes that used the association 
members’ products.  In other words, refusal of the certification actually meant total 
exclusion from the market.  See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods. Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 
846 F.2d 284, 291 n.21 (5th Cir. 1988). 
40 See, e.g., Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 
1989) (physician’s association could not violate antitrust, as a matter of law, by publicly 
asserting that a new medical procedure was “experimental”); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron 
Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 489–91 (1st Cir. 1988) (SSO did not violate antitrust by 
refusing to certify manufacturer’s product as compliant with SSO’s product standard); 
Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d 284 (denial of certification of a product as compliant with 
defendant SSO’s standard, even where SSO includes horizontal competitors whose 
products would compete with plaintiff’s new, cheaper technology, and the evidence 
suggested that denial was “unjustified,” could not violate antitrust); Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l 
Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (SSO’s testing and certification program 
could not violate antitrust even though it tended to exclude non-approved products from 
the market). 
41 See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 296; Eliason, 614 F.2d at 129. 
42 See generally Gates, supra note 2, at 643–47 (summarizing the case law and making 
a similar criticism). 
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antitrust laws do not themselves impose on joint ventures a 
requirement of process.43 
That one passage, after all, put to rest some decades of lower court 
case law on SSOs that had said quite the opposite.44  But at least in 
the SSO context, Justice Brennan’s broad language cannot mean what 
it says.  Rule of reason treatment of SSO conduct almost inevitably 
invites consideration of the process by which the challenged decision 
was reached.  Radiant Burners, which is still nominally good law,45 
appears to have based its theory of liability on the SSO’s failure to 
apply “objective standards” to its certification decisions, instead 
making them “arbitrarily and capriciously.”  It also mattered that the 
exclusion of plaintiff’s products was effected regardless of “what[] 
may [have] be[en] their virtues.”46  Allied Tube and Hydrolevel even 
more plainly found anticompetitive effects on abuses or evasions of 
procedural norms. 
Likewise, it is unclear to what if any extent rule of reason analysis 
is permitted as to the substance of an SSO’s decision.  A few courts 
seem to have implied that the technical grounds for the SSO’s 
decision cannot be considered in antitrust litigation,47 but that has 
been unpopular with commentators and appears not to be uniformly 
the law.48  Indeed, it is hard to imagine that it really could be the law.  
If in a given case a standard was clearly baseless or manifestly 
contrary to the scientific evidence, it seems likely that courts would 
consider that fact relevant to anticompetitive purpose and effects. 
II 
THE UBIQUITY OF PRIVATE COORDINATION AND ISOMORPHIC 
MARKETS 
No one can presently say how many SSOs there are or how many 
standards they issue.  One estimate puts the number of private 
 
43 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293 (1985). 
44 See Gates, supra note 2, at 616–17. 
45 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2210 (2010) (citing 
Radiant Burners as authority for treatment of legally single entities as subject to section 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act in some cases). 
46 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658–59 
(1961). 
47 See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 292. 
48 See Anton & Yao, supra note 2, at 248; Gates, supra note 2, at 644–47. 
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standards in operation at something over one million,49 but that 
estimate is probably conservative.  Regardless of whether a full 
estimate is even really theoretically feasible, it likely will never be 
undertaken.50  At least for the time being, it is thought that the 
majority of U.S. standards are made by only about twenty of the 
largest, traditional voluntary consensus SSOs,51 but the remaining 
minority is undertaken by a very large number of other entities.  The 
range of products and services they regulate is mind-boggling, even 
within the more traditional technology and manufacturing sectors.52  
The very substance of matters such as education, international 
business transactions, medical procedures, accounting rules, 
regulation of the professions, and human safety are simply no longer 
 
49 This is the current estimate at one of the most comprehensive repositories of 
standards-related information, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011).  That site is maintained in part by a private law firm, Gesmer 
Updegrove, LLC, and was initially created with financial support from Sun Microsystems.  
Id. 
50 There are two things wrong with all current attempts to keep track of active SSOs.  
First, those lists that exist tend to include only technical product or process organizations.  
They exclude the large range of other private regulatory bodies that ought to be included, 
at least for my purposes here.  For example, they usually exclude the American Bar 
Association, even though its function as the accreditor of U.S. law schools could not be 
any more like “standard setting.”  See Case Study, supra note 1, at 1411–12.  Second, 
following the rise of the contemporary high-tech economy, and the advantages in high-
tech industries for private standardization, the creation, life, and death of new SSOs has 
accelerated to a tremendous pace.  See Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 2, at 1896–
98 (explaining the nature and current circumstances of SSOs in high-tech industries). 
51 As of about 2006, ANSI estimated that the twenty largest SSOs produce about ninety 
percent of U.S. standards, but it has not since revised that estimate.  See Introduction to 
ANSI, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx?menuid=1 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
52 These include, for example, the Air Conditioning Contractors of America, the 
Building Performance Institute, the Cemented Carbide Producers Association, the Door 
and Access Systems Manufacturers Association, the Electrical Apparatus Service 
Association, the Fluid Controls Institute, the Glazing Industry Secretariat Committee, the 
Hardwood Plywood & Veneer Association, the International Association of Plumbing & 
Mechanical Officials, the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, the 
Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers Association, the Laser Institute of America, Mobility Golf, 
the National Air Duct Cleaners Association, the Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, the 
Portable Sanitation Association International, the Rubber Manufacturers Association, the 
Society for Protective Coatings, the Truss Plate Institute, the Unified Abrasives 
Manufacturers Association, the Vinyl Institute, and the Window and Door Manufacturers 
Association.  ANSI, ACCREDITED STANDARDS DEVELOPERS (2011),  available at 
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards Activities/American National 
Standards/ANSI Accredited Standards Developers/FEB11ASD-basicinfo-1.pdf. 
 Appropriately enough, there is an SSO known as the Porcelain Enamel Institute.  See 
PORCELAIN ENAMEL INST., http://www.porcelainenamel.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
Presumably, it represents the interests of manufacturers of the kitchen sink. 
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in the hands of the “government” as we have traditionally known it.53  
Groups with characteristics that are essentially similar to the SSOs 
with which we are familiar––that is, essentially similar traits, 
memberships, and procedures––are engaged in similar conduct 
throughout the U.S. economy. 
To claim that these groups seem “essentially similar” is not 
superficial or aesthetic.  It has an important theoretical purpose.  All 
such groups (1) “regulate,” in the sense that their standardizing acts 
have some source of influence, and therefore constrain the choices 
that individuals and firms might otherwise make on a price basis, and 
(2) the substance of those “regulatory” actions cannot be assumed 
simply to reflect or incorporate the influences of price competition. 
The second of those claims is the more important one, and it is the 
claim that I offer as my first critique of the bureaucracy-markets 
dichotomy.  One might try to argue that price theory remains 
essentially unaffected by the profusion of standard setting, if we could 
assume that so many SSOs have come into being only to do more 
efficiently what markets might otherwise do.  That would imply a 
theory of market ordering that resembles the “make-or-buy” decision 
modeled in the work of Oliver Williamson and other neo-
institutionalist or “transaction cost” economists.54  That is, we might 
argue that SSO members collaborate only to save on some costs that 
would occur if they tried to achieve similar results independently.55  
 
53 In some sense this may be a misleading way to phrase the problem.  It is often not the 
case that private groups have taken over regulatory work that previously was done by 
government.  Many of the problems now handled by private SSOs, even to the extent that 
they existed or were perceived as matters of social concern before the SSOs tried to solve 
them, were never governmentally regulated except through the common law of tort, 
property, and contract.  See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (describing a continuum of regulatory approaches from tort 
law at one end to fully invasive regulation at the other and noting that, prior to the 
twentieth century, most “regulation” tended far toward the tort law end of the spectrum). 
54 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1983); R.H. Coase, The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 398–401 (1937). 
55 There have been efforts to model private regulatory conduct—which can be thought 
of as a “privatization” of a government regulatory function—as merely a make-or-buy 
decision.  See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE 
MEANS (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 
389 (2003); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999); see also Terry M. Moe, The 
New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 758–66 (1984) (charting the 
then nascent rise of transaction-cost applications to politics and public bureaucracy, while 
being cautiously optimistic about the movement’s promise, despite concerns that important 
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If so, even markets pervasively overseen by SSOs could still lead to 
equilibria very similar to those that markets themselves would 
produce in the absence of transaction costs.  That would seriously 
undercut my criticism of the bureaucracy-markets dichotomy; it could 
be the case that sectors not directly overseen by governments are 
effectively still market-regulated.  We might hypothesize that 
standards would tend to minimize production cost—just the way 
markets do.  Or they might optimize dynamic efficiency or lead to 
ethical conduct among professionals that is optimal given the costs to 
clients.  But we would need to multiply the minimum number of 
assumptions rather dramatically to reach this result—to argue that 
private standards simply produce the same, allocationally efficient 
equilibria that cost-free markets would otherwise produce.  The 
argument would imply that the individual SSO participants take each 
of their specific actions as opportunities to maximize their own or 
their employers’ gains from sales of goods or services.  This seems 
exceedingly unlikely, especially in formal consensus SSOs, where 
participants include many members from government and academia.  
Moreover, even in the seemingly more profit-motivated industry 
consortia, engineering staff ordinarily represents member firms.  
Those employees pose not only the agency cost problems that occur 
in all organizations but also the special problem that engineers are 
influenced by a professional culture, and as a group, they have been 
shown to be frequently hostile to the profit-maximizing interests of 
individual firms.56  These points are borne out by the theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggesting that SSO technical committees 
ordinarily do not reach decisions that would maximize the member-
firms’ self-interest.57 
Thus, I believe that SSOs are an important example of the 
mediating buffer that some social scientists perceive between price 
pressures and individual or firm decision making.  Among the leading 
exponents are sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, who 
argue that “the engine of organizational rationalization has shifted” 
 
differences exist between political organizations and the profit-motivated firms that were 
the traditional subject of transaction-cost models). 
56 See sources cited supra note 10. 
57 See Weiss, supra note 10, at 37–41 (modeling technical committee voting behavior, 
using both public choice theory and game theory, to suggest that voting equilibria will be 
unstable and subject to strategic behavior); Martin B.H. Weiss & Marvin A. Sirbu, 
Technological Choice in Voluntary Standards Committees: An Empirical Analysis, 1 
ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 111 (1990). 
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from the desire for efficient markets to “individual efforts to deal 
rationally with uncertainty and constraint,” efforts that take place 
within organizations of “key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce 
similar services or products.”58  Moreover, they argue that these 
social institutions—these “efforts to deal rationally” with 
circumstances—seem to grow more similar over time, which reflects 
something important about society.  Admitting that some of this 
“isomorphism” among organizations could be explained by 
competitive forces, as of course would be the traditional 
explanation,59 DiMaggio and Powell argue that much institutional 
isomorphism has become shielded from the rationalizing influence of 
market competition.  A larger implication of their work is that as 
institutions themselves come to have greater independent 
rationalizing force––as they grow in their bilateral power asymmetry 
vis-à-vis natural persons and other organizations––they increasingly 
displace the regulatory importance either of traditional government 
institutions or market pressures. 
III 
THE ANTITRUST MODEL OF “GOVERNMENT” AND THE CAUSATION 
ISSUE 
In Part II, I argue that the work of SSOs, even when they are not 
overseen by government, cannot be assumed to be simply some 
market-driven phenomenon explainable by price theory.  In this Part, 
I argue that SSOs also illuminate a different problem, which I have 
said is a flip-side problem.  They cast doubt on the idea that activity 
removed from market constraints is thereby, ipso facto, overseen by 
the publicly accountable institutions of our traditional democratic 
theory.  This will be seen in the federal case law in which courts have 
been asked for a remedy against SSOs for plaintiffs harmed when a 
formal government body adopts an SSO’s standard.  Most of these 
cases have considered only the availability of antitrust relief, but there 
clearly is no remedy of any kind against an SSO in such a case.  And, 
of course, SSOs are not subject to the democratic constraints of 
 
58 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 
147–48 (1983); see also Olshan, supra note 9. 
59 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
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formal government because none of their members are elected.  In 
other words, SSOs are to some extent exempt from market oversight 
(as I argue in Part II), but they are also removed from those very 
judicial and democratic constraints that define our ordinary notion of 
government. 
Whether they like to admit it or not, when courts apply antitrust, 
they necessarily imply a model of government in some cases.  
Inevitably, given certain deep commitments in our political 
philosophy, some antitrust cases will seem to pose the risk that a 
private person or firm will be held personally liable even though the 
real “cause” of the harm was something that the government did.  The 
Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether a private person 
could be liable for harm caused by government, despite some 
arguments to the contrary.60  The issue has arisen quite prominently 
in a line of lower court decisions involving SSOs that are privately 
organized but have become influential with state and local 
governments.  Again, when government adopts private standards, the 
act of adoption frequently involves little or no substantive 
deliberation about the standards themselves.  These adoptions are 
rubber stamps.  State and local governments have even occasionally 
incorporated by reference future amendments to a private standard.  
Moreover, relations between powerful SSOs and their state 
government clients have often developed over long periods, with 
mutual benefits, and often with the SSOs’ careful nurturing.  
Nevertheless, in a series of lower court decisions that now appear 
firmly established, the courts have held that SSOs in such 
circumstances enjoy Noerr-Pennington immunity for any harm that 
flows from the government-adopted standards.61  The idea is that the 
 
60 See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
61 See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1037 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding the ABA immune from antitrust action for law school accreditation 
activities); Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 301 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(immunizing deliberate misrepresentations to an SSO because alleged harm was caused by 
government regulation, not lobbying efforts); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 
1383 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the ABA immune for promulgation of model ethical rules); 
Sherman Coll. of Straight Chiropractic v. Am. Chiropractic Ass’n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 728 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding chiropractic trade association immune for school accreditation 
activities), aff’d without opinion 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar 
Ass’n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding the ABA immune for accreditation 
activities); cf. Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that, while a psychiatric certification board’s decisions were the basis 
of granting certain state benefits, the board was not a “state actor”). 
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SSO is simply a private entity petitioning its government, asking that 
a particular model code it has drafted be made law. 
The Seventh Circuit, in a somewhat notorious opinion, also 
suggested that standardization really is only the expression of opinion, 
even when there is no government involvement whatsoever.  The 
court held that, because an SSO’s certification ruling is no more than 
the “provi[sion] [of] information,” it cannot violate antitrust so long 
as it “does not constrain others to follow its recommendations.”62  
That characterization would seem incorrect in light of the previously 
decided Allied Tube,63 but more important for the present topic was 
the opinion’s metaphysical characterization of what standardization 
is.  Writing for the majority, Judge Easterbrook came perilously close 
to calling it constitutionally protected speech.  He wrote that an SSO’s 
 
 The issue would have come up again in the FTC’s Unocal action had that matter not 
been resolved by consent decree, and it would have been raised there in a novel posture.  
Rather than a nominally private SSO defendant asserting immunity, Unocal would have 
been a private defendant asserting immunity for engaging in a patent hold-up before a 
quasi-public SSO.  Unocal successfully raised that Noerr-Pennington theory before an 
administrative law judge, but the Commission reversed, finding both that there was a 
“fraud” exception to the immunity and that some of Unocal’s illegal conduct had occurred 
before nongovernment entities.  Union Oil Co. of Cal., 138 F.T.C. 1, 72 (2004).  The issue 
was mooted, however, when Unocal merged with Chevron, and Chevron entered a consent 
decree with the Commission.  Under the decree Chevron agreed not to assert any of 
Unocal’s rights under patents included in the CARB standard.  Chevron Corp., 140 F.T.C. 
100 (2005). 
62 Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989). 
63 Schachar attempted to distinguish Allied Tube as having involved more than a mere 
adoption of a standard—that it involved some “enforcement device[].”  Id.  But that 
distinction seems utterly incorrect.  See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 
486 U.S. 492, 498 n.2 (1988) (noting that the only theory of harm on which the verdict for 
plaintiff had been based––a verdict that the Court upheld––was “the stigma of not 
obtaining [an SSO’s] approval of [plaintiff’s] products and [the defendant SSO member’s] 
‘marketing’ of that stigma,” which “caused independent marketplace harm to [plaintiff] in 
those jurisdictions permitting use of” plaintiff’s product);  see also id. at 500 (“In this case, 
the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated was the [SSO’s] exclusion of 
[plaintiff’s] product” from its standard.); Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Liability for 
Collective Speech: Medical Society Practice Standards, 27 IND. L. REV. 51, 63–78 (1993) 
(criticizing Schachar and its disregard for the anticompetitive potential of some 
information). 
 Consolidated Metal Products is a similar decision, and it contains dicta that might seem 
to support the reasoning in Schachar, but the resemblance is superficial only.  Consol. 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988).  In that case, 
plaintiff’s product was certified as compliant with the SSO’s standard.  Id. at 288.  
Plaintiff’s entire theory of harm was that the SSO’s certification process took longer than 
plaintiff thought appropriate (two years––perfectly ordinary in the context of voluntary 
consensus standard setting), and plaintiff failed to plead any facts relevant to either 
conspiracy or anticompetitive effect.  Id. at 293–97. 
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“towering reputation does not reduce its freedom to speak out,” and 
that when it does so, “the remedy is not antitrust litigation but more 
speech—the marketplace of ideas.”64 
In any case, that all might actually be fine if the courts gave some 
consideration to whether, having removed SSOs from antitrust 
review, they have preserved some other alternative for affected parties 
to challenge the substantive policy adopted as law.  For example, it 
might not be so bad if, by holding an SSO exempt from antitrust when 
it plays some role in making public policy, the courts meant to imply 
that they will then hold the SSO subject to the rules of process, 
representativeness, and transparency to which we hold our 
government institutions.  (E.g., they might make available some 
redress to plaintiffs under notions of due process or open government 
from constitutional or administrative law.)  Or the courts might reason 
that, where the state rubber stamps an SSO standard, the state itself 
could be subject to constitutional or administrative challenges for 
process failures that occurred within the SSO’s standard-setting work. 
But of course the courts intend no such thing.  Privately organized 
SSOs not acting pursuant to any formal delegation of government 
authority are subject to no obligations of constitutional or 
administrative law, either directly or indirectly through review of the 
state actors who adopt their standards.65  And there is little likelihood 
of judicial challenge to government adoption of a previously 
formulated private standard, no matter how flawed the SSO’s process 
may have been, particularly if the adoption is made by a state 
legislature or Congress.  Also, obviously enough, SSOs are not 
subject to the other major constraint that democracies are thought to 
place on their governments––the ballot box. 
Moreover, a little-noticed problem is that, having inadvertently 
created this class of odd, intermediary organizations, which live 
between but are subject to neither public nor private law, the courts 
have at least in some cases devised an ideal vehicle for the 
distribution of state and local government pork-barrel largesse.  It is 
agreed by wide consensus that, in the pursuit of monopoly, there is no 
better accomplice than government.  These SSO immunity decisions 
have created a way to seek government assistance––through the 
adoption of privately arranged standards––that are triply impenetrable 
to challenge.  First, the work of SSOs will ordinarily be substantively 
 
64 Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399–400. 
65 See Case Study, supra note 1. 
SAGERS 4/5/2011  3:22 PM 
808 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 785 
inscrutable to the politicians who adopt them.  Because state and local 
officials typically will have little ability to second-guess the 
substantive work that SSOs do, they will have no way to know 
whether some unscrupulous party was able to manipulate an SSO.  
Second, because SSOs are subject to no public law rules, interference 
in their work by unscrupulous parties will not be subject to public 
scrutiny through transparency or process obligations.  And finally, so 
long as a monopoly-granting standard is adopted as law, it cannot be 
reviewed by courts for anticompetitiveness.  In such a case, SSOs 
appear to be truly impervious to all the legal tools that we have.66 
IV 
IS THERE SOME ALTERNATIVE AS A MATTER OF POLICY? 
While this Article is not meant to offer doctrinal solutions, it is 
worth considering whether there are problems here that could be 
better handled by our law.  I think the short answer is, probably, no, at 
least not with any short-term political feasibility.  Elsewhere I have 
written about the occasional doctrinal suggestions for better handling 
the problem of entities in between the public and the private.67  I 
believe those other attempts, including my own, have been at best 
incomplete.68  While I am not yet sure I can now offer any better 
solution, I believe the fundamental, root issue underlying the problem 
is the murky concept of government as the “cause” of antitrust injury.  
The courts in these cases are repelled by the idea of private liability 
for government conduct.  Though the reasons remain largely 
unexpressed, it is no doubt from a commitment to our traditional 
 
66 It has apparently been suggested on occasion that this all might be tolerable 
nonetheless, given that much standard setting is done by voluntary consensus procedures.  
See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Law and Constitutionalism in the Mirror of Non-Governmental 
Standards: Comments on Harm Schepel, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 189, 195–96 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).  I am not 
comforted. 
67 Pork in Texas, supra note 1, at 414–16. 
68 My own effort was in Case Study, supra note 1.  The problem with that approach was 
that, while it would allow antitrust to check some abuses in overly close relationships 
between governments and SSOs, it would pose a substantial risk to more traditional 
lobbying.  The other effort of which I am aware is the work of Einer Elhauge.  See Einer 
Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1177 (1992); 
Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991).  I 
believe the problem in Elhauge’s otherwise exhaustive and perceptive synthesis to be that, 
though he seems to deny it, his approach would still require that, if injury is “caused” in 
some ill-defined sense by “government,” no private defendant could be liable for it.  See 
generally Pork in Texas, supra note 1. 
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liberal individualism that courts find any alternative unthinkable.  But 
in fact, they are quite wrong. 
At least in the abstract, if not in any politically plausible actual 
outcome, this problem could be overcome.  Scrutiny as to state or 
local government “causation” is not relevant to any policy of the 
antitrust laws, and protection from liability for harm “caused” by 
government is not actually required by the First Amendment.69  
Moreover, I believe that Allied Tube––the opinion in which the 
Supreme Court came closest to addressing the question of private 
liability for harm caused by government action––did not actually hold 
otherwise.  The Court carefully reserved the question and did not 
reach it.70  There is also this point: Allied Tube was written by Justice 
Brennan, a jurist personally concerned with the place of voluntary 
associations in our political order.71  Northwest Wholesale Stationers 
(which he also wrote) plainly showed his concern that voluntary 
associations not be too easily turned into “government” in the 
traditional sense, refusing to let antitrust review evolve into an 
administrative law that would render those associations subject to 
duties of process and transparency.  But a Justice who also believed in 
the mission of the antitrust laws could not thereby have intended to 
create this ambiguous third category of institutions in between the 
public and private, subject neither to the government’s process 
constraints nor private law.  All the reasoning in Allied Tube is flatly 
against such a result. 
Moreover, for what it may be worth, there remain at least two 
government enforcement actions, the results of which have not been 
overturned, in which a private entity was forced to submit to 
injunctive relief for harms “caused” by government.  This was true in 
the FTC’s Unocal consent decree of 2005, mentioned above.72  There, 
 
69 See Case Study, supra note 1, at 1397. 
70 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 498 n.2 (1988) 
(declining to consider an award for injuries against private parties stemming from the 
adoption of a government ethics code). 
71 Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984).  First Amendment 
freedom of association recognizes  
that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and 
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; 
they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and 
the power of the State.  . . .  [The freedom] safeguards the ability independently 
to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty. 
Id. 
72 See supra note 4. 
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a patentee of environmentally superior gasoline technology was found 
by the FTC to have violated antitrust when it misled a California 
regulatory authority into incorporating its patented technology into a 
state-mandated standard.  Likewise, in the consent order reached in 
American Society of Sanitary Engineering in 1985,73 the FTC frankly 
acknowledged that its theory of harm was based on adoption by state 
and local governments of the defendant SSO’s standards.  Indeed the 
FTC apparently asserted no other basis for liability.  The FTC, at 
least, believes that government as “cause” of the asserted harm is not 
a bar to liability. 
V 
CONCLUSIONS AND THIS SYMPOSIUM’S THEME 
The question posed by the American Antitrust Institute’s 
symposium was whether the boundaries between what is public and 
what is private might be in transition.  I am not sure just how broadly 
I can answer that question on the basis of the SSO evidence alone.  
After all, there is a whole world of discussion now of “privatizing” or 
“contracting out” arrangements, and much of our economy is 
governed or affected by our dozens of quasi-public federal 
corporations and “government sponsored entities.”  But in one sense 
at least I believe I can say that the character of our resource allocation 
has not actually changed that much in some time.  So in a crude sense, 
my answer is no, the boundaries are not in transition.  Throughout 
much of the twentieth century, important policy choices have been 
made by entities that make “standards,” broadly defined.  Those 
entities are not formal government entities, and they are not very 
similar to our traditional democratic institutions. But their work is 
also not easily explained as the result of any market forces.  So at the 
very least, I think our imagery for understanding the “boundaries” 
between government and the private sector leaves a lot of detail 
unaccounted for.  But on the other hand, I do not believe that that 
state of affairs has really changed very much for many decades. 
 
 
73 Am. Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’rs, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1985). 
